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NOTES
Is A FRANCHISE PROPERTY?
In 1884, in New York City, six gas companies operating
under franchises obtained without charge, lawfully combined.
In estimating the amount contributed by each, its franchise
was considered, the combined value of all the franchises
amounting to $7,781,oo, and upon this new stock was issued.
A statute, subsequently passed, provided that no gas company
of New York City should charge said city more than 75 cents
per iooo feet; that the pressure of such gas should be not less
than i in. nor more than 2% in.; and that any corporation
violating this Act should forfeit $iooo for each offense.
In considering the constitutionality of this Act in Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., decided January 4, 19°9, the United
(315)
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States Supreme Court held that the penalties were so excessive
that the gas companies were-prevented from testing the validity
of the Act for fear that if the decision should be adverse to
them, their property would be entirely swept away by the
penalties, and that the Act to this extent was unconstitutional as
not giving equal protection of the laws; 1 and that the provision
as to maintaining a certain pressure, which could not be done
without renewing to a large extent the equipment of the gas
companies and which w6uld'not allow an adequate return on
the property at the rate specified, was unconstitutional as taking
property without, due process. However, as these two pro-
visions were separable from the rest, and as it could be plainly
seen that the Legislature would wish the remainder of the Act
passed even without these 'unconstitutional provisions, it was
declared constitutional to that extent.
2
But by far the most important question considered was
whether a company which has obtained a franchise without cost,
may demand a return on that franchise as part of its property.
As an original proposition, the lower court denied that a fran-
chise is property; -3 but the Supreme Court says that "it cannot
be disputed that franchises of this nature are property and
cannot be taken or used by others without compensation."
As to the real nature of a franchise there are different opin-
ions. One high authority classes it as a species of intangible
property.4 A modem case holds that the right of franchise,
when purchased, "constitutes property within the usual and
common significance of that word." r As paying for the fran-
chise could make no difference in its character after it was
gained, this fact would seem to be immaterial in considering
whether or not it is property. It has been held that a franchise
is merely a characteristic of the corporeal property which is
being used under the franchise; that the value of the property
is increased by the franchise, and that a return should be had
on this increased value.6 Somewhat the same idea is expressed
by a text writer to the effect that "franchises clearly have a
'Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (igo8).
' See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (igo8), where the
Act, as here, was considered divisible; and Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S.
161 (9o8), where the Act was considered indivisible.
'Consolidated Gas Co. v. City of N. Y., I57 Fed. 849, at p. 873.
"'The Elements of Jurisprudence," by T. E. Holland, 9th ed., p. 200
(19oo).
'People v. O'Brien, ini N. Y., i, at p. 40 (i888).
'Water Dist. v. Water Co., 99 Maine, 377 (19o5); Monongahela
Nav. -Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, at p. 337 (1892).
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value if the word value is used to signify the advantage derived
from their possession, or, in other words, their utility." I The
fallacy of considering franchises property was said by the
lower court to be caused by "a failure to distinguish between
productive and non-productive property. Land * * * may
by industry and intelligence be made productive without a
franchise; but no excellence in these desirable qualities can
ultimately render a franchise productive without the use of
money, chattels, and land in conjunction therewith ;" and when
joined, the franchise contributes nothing since "it has but au-
thorized their [land, chattels, etc.] employment in a particular
way and protected the owners while so employing them."
Granted that it is non-productive, nevertheless it is property,
and the law does protect non-productive property; such as, for
instance, a trade-mark.
Considering the franchise as property, the economic question
whether a return should be allowed upon it, remains. At this
point the question whether the franchise was paid for or not,
which was immaterial in considering whether it was property,
becomes material. "Return can be expected only from in-
vestment and he that invests must part with something in the
act of investing." 8 So where the franchise has cost nothing,
no return should be allowed on it,' even though a different
result should be arrived at where the corporation has paid for it.
A suggestion in a recent case is that though the right to do the
work which the corporation is allowed to do is a property right,
which belongs to the state; the state buts this in the business and
the company puts in its corporeal property and should get a
return only on its corporeal property. The objection made to
this is that the state has given over its right and does not retain
it, and to say that it does is a mere fiction.1°
The lower court had found that the value of the franchise
had increased proportionately with the increase in the value of
the other property; but the Supreme Court held that the value
of the franchises is to be taken as of the time when they were
transferred to the combined company, and cannot be consid-
ered as having advanced in value with a corresponding advance
in the general business; because in view, among other things,
TA Treatise on "The Law of Private Corporations," by V. Morawetz,
2nd ed., sec. 929.
'Consol. Gas Co. v. City of N. Y., supra, at p. 873.
'"Law of Railroad Rate Regulation," by Beale & Wyman, sec. 362
(io6).
" Water Dist. v. Water Co., supra.
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of the recent legislation looking toward a lessening of the huge
dividends given by the company, it cannot be said with cer-
tainty that the value of the franchise did increase.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SELF-DEFENCE.
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Palmer,' the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed the doctrine, that "if the evi-
dence clearly, establishes the killing by the prisoner purposely,
with a deadly weapon, an illegal homicide of some kind is estab-
lished and the burden then falls upon the prisoner, and not on
the commonwealth, to show that it was excusable as an act of
self-defence." This doctrine has been consistently followed in
this state since enunciated by Agnew, J., 2 and obtains in many
other jurisdictions.8 It must be admitted that the courts of this
state are consistent in placing upon the accused the burden of
proving by a fair preponderance of evidence that he did not
act maliciously or wilfully as in insanity,' drunkenness 5 or
self-defence,6 so as to overcome the presumption of intent
employed to establish a prima facie case.
It is admitted by all that the act and the intent are essential
elements of the crime-and that these elements must concur.
Malice aforethought or premeditation and deliberation are
necessary for murder in the first degree.7 The prosecution must
prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt before the
accused can be convicted.8 Because of the difficulty of proving
the mind of man, a presumption has been raised 9 to assist the
prosecution. This presumption has been declared one of law
and not of fact. By means of this presumption, the presump-
tion of innocence is overthrown.
Thayer,10 Wigmore,11 Cooley,' 2 Mr. Justice Harlan,18 Mr.
1222 Pa. 299.
258 Pa. 9 (1868); Ortwein v. Coin., 76 Pa. 414 (I847).
M'Naghtin's Case, 2 Cl. and F. i90 (1843).
'Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9.
'Com. v. Honeyran, Add. 147 (793).
ICom. v. Crouse, 4 Clark, 298 (846).
'Com. v. Hagerty, Lewis' Abridgment, 402 (1847).
' Lewis' "Abridgment of Criminal Law," 397.
'O'Mara v. Cont., 75 Pa. 425.
'Thayer on Evidence, 380, 381, 382.
Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2501.
"People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9.
" Davis v. U. S., i6o U. S. 469.
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Justice Gray 14 and many others say this doctrine of the burden
of proof in affirmative defences cannot be sustained on prin-
ciple. Such expressions as "an illegal homicide," "murder,"
an "unlawful act" or a "crime" are not correct in legal termi-
nology when applied to the prosecution's case alone. That the
accused confesses to the elements of any such offence and then
sets up an affirmative defence of insanity, or self-defence, is
not true in fact or theory. The pleadings and the facts show a
denial of one of the elements necessary to the crime.15 The act
was either lawful or unlawful and the intent either such as pro-
duced a crime or no crime. There is no middle ground. Once
the crime is proven or admitted, mitigation or pardon alone are
proper. Excuse and justification cannot enter where the crime
is established, but are properly employed to show there was no
crime by way of denial and not by way of avoidance.
While it is eminently proper that the intent should be pre-
sumed to establish a prima fade case for the prosecution, the
law does not then say that the acts were unlawful or constituted
a crime unless the accused admits them. Ordinarily, an act is
judged only when all the evidence is in and the accused has
submitted his confession or defence; and it is for the jury to
decide the character of the act from all the evidence.'0
If the presumption of intent is one of law, then no amount
of evidence in direct denial should be able to overthrow "7 it
and the question of intent ceases to be an essential element of
the crime. But if the presumption is one of fact, presumed in
law, then such presumption should be as any other fact, to
answer its proper purpose-to establish a prima facie case-
but no more. The jury should then pass upon it, together with
all the other facts and a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the intent should be a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
any crime.' 8 The burden of proof should remain on the prose-
cution throughout, while the necessity for the production of
evidence may vary.
However, for a century or more this rule has obtained in
some form in this state. Numerous jusrisdictions have adopted
it in insanity and a less number in self-defence. The facility
of proving the facts and circumstances of self-defence will
justify the distinction made in some jurisdictions betveen it
"Com. v. Pomeroy, Wharton on Homicide (2nd ed.), 753.
"Dove v. State, 3 Heiskill (Tenn.), 366 (1872).
"Bunn v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666 (I898).
"Thayer on Evidence, 380.
uPlummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308 (1893).
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and insanity. Judicial experience, public policy and history
may well justify this doctrine, 19 but principle and theory for its
existence can hardly be found.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT AGAINST A SURETY IN A SUIT
BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Haggart,'
it was decided that a judgment obtained by the United States
against a marshal and the Guaranty Company as sureties on his
bond for the proper performance of his duties and those of his
deputies, is conclusive evidence of the default of the deputies,
in a suit by the Guaranty Company against the administratrix
of the marshal's estate.
The Guaranty Company had paid the judgment of the first
suit and then sued the marshal's estate (the marshal having
died since the judgment) for reimbursement. The adminis-
tratrix in defence found that the Guaranty Company was surety
for the deputy that defaulted, on this deputy's bond to the
marshal, but the only evidence that the administratrix offered
of the fact of the deputy's default was the judgment in the
action brought by the United States.
In holding the judgment to be conclusive evidence the Court
cites two classes of cases to sustain the decision.
The first class contains cases in which the parties to the
action were co-defendants in the former action, the judgment
of which is sought to be put in evidence, and the point now
in controversy between them was necessarily adjudicated in the
prior action.
2
In such a case the defendant in the second suit, having once
contested the point, is forbidden to raise it again.
The second class of cases are those in which the parties
have not been joined in the former suit, yet the judgment of
that suit is evidence of the facts there adjudicated in a suit
between them.
This situation may arise in two ways:
I. Where a surety is sued by the creditor and pays the judg-
ment. The surety then sues the principal for reimbursement
and puts in evidence the judgment by the creditor against him.
"Wharton on Homicide (3rd ed.), 55o; Wigmore on Evidence,
2501; Davis v. U. S., 16o U. S. 469.
1 163 Federal, 8oi (i9o8), C. C. A.
2Lloyd v. Barr, ii Pa. 41 (1849); compare McMahon v. Geiger,
73 Mo. 145 (i88o).
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It snch cases it haq been held that if the principal was not
notified of the former suit, then the judgment in that action
i- only prima facie evidence against him in the suit by the
surety. " But if the principal does have notice, then the former
judgment is concln'-ive against him.4 The reason given is that
"when a person is responsible over to another, either by op-
eration of law or express contract and he is duly notified of
the pendency of the suit and requested to take upon himself
the defence of it. lie is no longer regarded as a stranger, be-
cause lie ha- the right to appear and defend the action, and
ha- the same means and advantages of controverting the claim
as if lie were the real and nominal party upon the record. In
every such case * * * the judgment * * * will be
conclusive evidence against him." ' Whether notice, then, to the
principal is important in determining the value of the evidence
of the judgment depends on a question of procedure, i. e.,
whether or not on notice being given the principal can defend.
1I. Where the creditor after getting judgment against the
principal. but not being able to get satisfaction of the judg-
ment. sties the surety and offers the judgment against the prin-
cipal as evidence of the facts there proved.
In such a case it has been said that the prior judgment is
prima facie evidence, irrespective of notice," or even if it is
admitted that no notice was given.
On the other hand such a judgment has been held conclusive
evidence eyen though the surety was given no notice.8 Some
court- have said that the judgment is no evidence at all,9 even
if the surety had notice and the principal conducted the for-
mer suit as the agent of the surety.10
As in the first class of cases, whether or not notice should
be important, should, it is submitted, depend on whether the
person notified can demand to be made a party."
'Snider v. Greathouse, I6 Ark. 72 (1885).
'1Iare v. Grant, 77 N. C. 2o3 (1877); Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N. Y.
571, the judgment here being a foreign one.
'Littleton v. Richardson, 34 N. H. 179, 187 (x856).
'Beauchaine v. McKinnon, 55 Minn. 318 (1893).
" City of Lowell v. Parker, To Mete. (Mass.), 315 (1845).
'Masser v. Strickland, 17 S. & R. 354 (1828); Tracy v. Goodwin,
87 Mass. 8og (1862).
'Pico v. Webster, 14 Cal. 202 (1859); Lucas v. Governor, 6 Ala.
826 (1844).
" Jackson v. Griswold, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 522 (1842).
"'See Ex parte Young, L. R. i7 Ch. Div. 668 (1881). It was
argued that the surety was not bound by the judgment against the
NOTES
The cases that hold that the evidence of the former judg-
ment is conclusive mfist do so on the ground that the princi-
pal and sureties are privies. The cases that hold that the judg-
ment is no evidence at all deny that there is any privity. Those
that hold the middle ground, namely that the judgment is
prima facie evidence, seem hard to sustain on principle, as is
admitted even by those courts that adopt it.1
2
In the civil law it seems that the principal and surety are
privies,"8 for the "obligation of the surety being dependent
upon that of the principal debtor, the surety is regarded as
the same party with the principal, with respect to whatever
is decided for or against him."
But in the common law where the surety contracts with the
creditor and is bound only by the terms of his contract with-
out regard to the stipulations of his principal, it seems just
that a different conclusion should be reached, and if the surety
has not actually defended the first judgment or at least had
the chance to do so, the doctrine of res inter alios acta should
apply.
THE ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS OF PAIN AND SUFFFRING.
The danger of admitting statements which were originally
made by another than him who testifies, and also the objection
that there was no opportunity for cross-examination, are the
salient reasons for excluding hearsay evidence 1 The rigidity of
this rule was felt in many instances. To palliate its effects,
certain exceptions sprung up. Necessity was the reason which
permitted the admission of dying declarations,2 pedigree, decla-
rations relating to matters of public or general interest, declara-
tions against interest by persons since deceased,4 declarations
principal since under the Judicature Act the surety could not demand
to be made a party, since he is not liable over td the principal. So
it was held that even with notice to the surety the judgment is no
evidence.
'Beauchaine v. McKinnon, 55 Minn. 318; see also Lucas v. Gov-
ernor, 6 Ala. 829.
' Cowen, J., in Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 53; and see Gibson,
C. J., in Masser v. Strickland, i7 S. & R. 359.
'See Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 520-523, for an-
other theory of its origin and growth.
'People v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332 (I898).
'Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U. S. 389 (x885).
'Halvorsen v. Moon & Keer Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18 (i9o2).
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made in the course of duty or business,5 and account books-
Then, too, the convenience of the matter has let down the bars
to a certain line of evidence, as public documents.7  Another
class of testimony is admitted because it, better than any other,
depicts the true state of affairs sought to be brought before the
jury: res gestae and declarations bearing upon the physical or
mental condition of the declarant. These two kinds of evidence
are separate and distinct and should not be confused, as is often
done in discussing either. It is our purpose to consider briefly
the latter of these two-the various expressions of pain which
may arise and how far they are admissible.
There are three sorts of expressions: (i) those describing a
past condition of pain; (2) a statement, perhaps in the form of a
complaint, describing a present physical condition; (3) an in-
voluntary shriek, groan or grimace. Then, too, the time of
utterance often becomes an important element, whether made
ante litem motam or post litem motarn. The person to whom
the statement is made likewise is a factor in the reckoning.
Simple narrations of past sufferings, whether made to laymen 8
or to physicians for treatment, are by the better law always
excluded.9
When we turn to a statement describing present bodily con-
dition, we enter disputed territory. Where the declaration is
made unfeignedly it should be received, regardless of the person
to whom it was made.' 0
The reason for such admittance is that it is the natural im-
pulse for one laboring under great bodily anguish to give vent
to his sufferings to bystanders, and that such hearers can better
describe his actual condition at that time when he may really
have been in a semi-consciousness, than he himself when called
upon the witness stand.
Such statements have been admitted in the majority of juris-
dictions.1 ' Other courts have limited their admission to ex-
pressions made to medical men on the theory that the physician
is better equipped to detect a malingerer, and to say whether a
bodily condition is simulated.'
2
'Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326 (1823).
'Poole v. Dicas, i Bing. (N. C.), 649 (1834).
"Whitehouse v. Bickford, 29 N. H. 471 (1854).
:McCeney v. Duvall, 21 Md. 166 (1863).
'Emerson v. Lowell Gas Co., 6 Allen, 146 (1863).
"Kennedy v. Brown, 25 Me. 46 (845).
Oliver v. R. Co., 65 S. C. I (1902); Keyes v. Ceday Falls, 107
Ia. i6 (1899).
'Brusch v. R. Co., 52 Minn. 512 (1893).
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The question of the time of utterance may come up in juris-
dictions following the majority rule as well as those accepting
the minority. If the purpose of the statements was for diag-
nosis and treatment, it would seem that they should be admitted,
even though made post litem motam, s or after suit has been
begun or during trial, 4 for nothing conduces to veracity so
much as the fact that upon the diagnosis made, the physician
will prescribe treatment. The weight of all such statements is
for the jury. 5  The objection that an utterance is post litem
motam was formerly confined entirely to matters of pedigree, or
to matters of public or general interest.'8
When, however, the statements are made simply to fit the
physician to testify, the better rule seems to be that such evi-
dence should be excluded.'7
If the evidence consists in a groan, a shriek of pain, or in-
voluntary grimace, the almost uniform law is that it should be
admitted irrespective of whether it was made to a physician or
layman.' 8 The question under discussion was involved in the
recent case of Kienninger v. Interurban Street Railway Com-
pany.'9 The court reversed the decision of the lower court in
a suit for personal damages, on the ground that the husband of
the plaintiff was permitted to testify to declarations made by
the plaintiff as to the condition of her health and as to injuries
from which it is claimed she suffered; and also that a physician
was permitted to testify to declarations of the plaintiff of the
same character which were made several months after the
accident.
The extreme brevity of the report makes it uncertain what
the nature of the statements were-whether merely narrative
or specious expressions of an existing condition. If they were
made to a physician to receive treatment, they were clearly
wrongfully excluded. Statements, though made a considerable
time after the injury, if indicative of a relative bodily condi-
tion at the time of declaration, are admissible.
20
"Sturgeon v. Sand Beach, 107 Mich. 496 (1895) ; Rowland v. Phila-
delphia R. Co., 63 Conn. 415 (1893).
"Morriss v. Haverhill, 65 N. H. 89 (1889) ; Fleming v. Springfield,
154 Mass. 520 (189I).
'Hagenlacher v. R. R., 99 N. Y. 136 (i885).
lei Greenlief (i ed.), sec. iO2.
'Pennsylvania Co. v. Files, 65 Ohio, 4o3 (goI).
"Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush. 581 (1862).
113 N. Y. Supp. 96 (igog).
Western Travelers Assoc. v. Munson, i L. R. A. (N. S.) io69
(Neb. i9o5).
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The rejection of the evidence of the husband is not surpris-
ing, for an anomaly exists in New York on this point. The
courts in that state have gone to the extent of holding that no
expressions of pain made to a bystander will be admitted; that
they must all be made to a physician for the purpose of treat-
ment.21 This view is the outcrop of a mistaken conception 22
of the Massachusetts court in Barber v. Merriam.2' The rule
there enunciated, which excluded statements of pain except
such as are made to a physician, was meant to apply, as appears
on analysis of the decision, only to statements of past condi-
tions and symptoms. The New York courts, on the other hand,
have applied it since that date to all statements of pain. How-
ever, screams, groans, shrieks and like signs of agony are re-
ceived in that state through the testimony of non-professional
men.2  The reason assigned for this exception is that they are
the spontaneous and natural outbursts of pain, which cannot
easily be simulated. Why cannot a groan be feigned as readily
as a statement of pain? It would seem that the danger of
spuriousness is just as great in the one case as the other. Is
not the more plausible rule that adopted by the majority of
jurisdictions, that all expressions of present pain, whether in
groans, shrieks or coherent and intelligible words, are ad-
missible, and that the test of the genuineness of such evidence
is left to the jury?
Is A PROMISE TO PmFORM SOME FUTURE ACT A STATEMENT
OF FACT?
In order to rescind a contract on the ground that it was
induced by a fraudulent representation, it is necessary to show
not only that the representation was false, but that it was in
regard to a material fact.' The same is true where the remedy
sought is an action of deceit. 2 As might be expected, consid-
erable difference of opinion exists as to where the boundary
line must be drawn between that which is fact and that which
is not, and a great deal of discussion has hedged about the
question of whether or not a promise is a representation of a
'Reed v. Railway Co., 45 N. Y. 578 (i87); Broyles v. Piscock,
Ga. 643 (1896).
'Wigmore, I11, 2209.
i i Allen, 332 (1865).
'Roche v. Rail Co., io5 N. Y. 294 (1887).
'Pollock on Contracts (Williston's Ed.), 687.
'Pollock on Torts (8th Ed.), 283.
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fact. It may be said that the general rule is that a promise to
perform some act in the future will not, if broken, amount to
fraud; provided there is present at the time an intention to
perform such act 3
The recent case of Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Company
v. Seidel, 113 Southwestern Reporter 945, decided in the Court
of Civil Appeals in Texas, recognizes the general rule above
stated, but holds that there is an exception recognized in Texas
to the effect that if at the time the promise was made it was the
intention of the party making it to disregard it, and it was only
made to deceive and entrap the other party, then such promise
in case the refusal to perform took place would amount to such
actual fraud as would justify the rescession of the contract in-
duced by such promise. In that case the plaintiff was induced
by the defendant's agent to give a note for the first premium on
a life insurance policy, on the promise by said agent that in case
plaintiff did not accept the policy, the note should be returned.
Plaintiff rejected the policy, but in the meantime defendant's
agent had negotiated the note. The jury found that at the time
the promise was given there was no intention of performance,
and the defendant was held liable to plaintiff for the amount of
the note. The court apparently went on the theory that
although the promise was not a representation of a fact, yet
having been made without any intention of performance, it was
such palpable fraud as to entitle plaintiff to relief. In support
of the court's decision, a previous Texas case 4 was cited, in
which it was said "that the representations related to matters
and things to be performed in the future cuts no figure what-
ever." To the same effect is a much quoted Connecticut case.,
There are, however, a number of cases which hold that a
promise is not a statement of fact, and refuse to make exception
recognized in the cases just cited. It was early laid down by
Mr. Chief Justice Brian that "the thought of man shall not be
tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man." 6
In a later English case,7 it was said that "a representation that
something will be done in the future cannot be true or false at
the momentit is made; although it may be called a representa-
tion, it is a contract or promise." In Illinois, it has been held
that "even if at the time the promises were made, it was not
'Pollock on Contracts (Williston's Ed.), 689, and cases cited.
4 Collinson v. Jefferies, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 653.
'Ayres v. French, 41 Conn. 142.
Y. D., 7 Ed. IV, f. 2, pl. 2.SMellish, L. J., in Beattie v. Ld. Ebury, 7 Ch. App. Cas. 8o4.
tIOTES
intended to comply with them, it was but an unexecuted inten-
ion, which has never been held of itself to constitute fraud." 8
There are, however, on the contrary, a great number of cases
which hold that a promise to perform an act in the future is a
statement of fact. Perhaps the best known of these is that in
which Bowen, L. J., said: "The state of a man's mind is as
much a matter of fact as the state of his digestion." 1 In a
comparatively recent case,' it was said that when one man
makes a promise to another as an inducement for a change of
position on the part of the latter, he, if not expressly, impliedly
avers that he has an existing intent to fulfil his promise, and
such implied averment of existing intent is a matter of fact,
and, if false and fraudulent, is a fraudulent representation.
It would seem that the latter line of cases represent the better
view. The difficulties encountered by adhering to the rule that
a promise is not a statement of fact are well illustrated in the
Illinois case,"' where strict adherence to the rule worked great
injustice, and in the Texas case, where, although a just result
is reached, yet it is inconsistent with the rule that a false repre-
sentation must be one of fact. On the other hand, treating a
promise to perform some act in the future as a statement of
intention, and treating intention as an existing fact, it follows
that if, at the time the promise was made, there was an inten-
tion to perform, subsequent non-performance would not consti-
tute fraud, while, on the other hand, if, at the time the promise
was made, no such intention existed, there would be a false rep-
resentation of a material fact, sufficient as a basis for giving the
injured plaintiff relief, thus reaching a result sound in morals
as well as in law.
THE EFFECT UPON THE LIABILITY OF A GUARANTOR OF A
CHANGE IN THE PERSONNEL OF THE OBLIGEE OR OF THE
PRINCIPAL DEBTOR.
It is a well settled rule of suretyship that the liability of
a guarantor or surety cannot be extended by implication or
otherwise-beyond the actual terms of his engagement. It
does not matter if the proposed alteration would result in his
benefit, for he has the right to stand upon the very terms of
his agreement. In the language of Lord Ellenborough, "the
'Gage v. Lewis, 68 Il. 6o4.
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"Rogers, et al., v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 149 Fed. Rep. i.
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claim against a surety is strictissimi juris." In accord, it is
the general rule that a guaranty when addressed to a particu-
lar person can only be acted upon and enforced by such party.'
A guaranty for goods to be sold to a firm has been held
not to cover advances made to one member of the partner-
ship.2 If a guaranty is made to a partnership and one of
the partners dies; 8 or if there is a change in the member-
ship of the firm in any other way the guaranty will not cover
any subsequent advances. "A, B, and C were partners in
banking and their particular articles of partnership provided
that if any one of the partners died the legal representative
of such one might take his place in the business. D guaran-
teed all sums, not exceeding £2,ooo, which should afterwards
become due to A, B, and C from E. A died and his repre-
sentative became a member of the firm. Held: D was not
liable for any advances made to E after the death of A." '
The reason for the rule is that, "a man may very well
agree to make good such advances, knowing that one of the
partners, on whose prudence he relies, will not agree to ad-
vance money improvidently."' Similarly, if a letter of
credit is directed to an individual, it will not support an action
for advances made by a firm of which the individual addressed
is a member or may subsequently become a member, for the
writer cannot be held to have consented to advances made by
the firm.8
All the above cases deal with the effect upon the liability
of the guarantor of a change in the personnel of the obligee.
The same results are found in the case where the personnel
of the. principal debtor is changed. The sureties on a bond
conditioned that the principal shall pay for all purchases made
by him 'from the obligee are not liable for purchases made
from the obligee by a partnership of which the principal is or
subsequently becomes a member.7 In this case the Court
said, "While they (the sureties) might be willing to be sure-
ties for Delano, it does not follow that they can be bound or
'Taylor v. Wetnore, io Ohio, 490; Smith v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.
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7 Hare, 5o.
'Cosgrave Brewing Co. v. Starrs, 5 Ont. (Canada) 189; Spiers
v. Houston, 4 Bligh (9 N. R.), 515.
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have consented to be bound, for the acts of any one whom
Delano may have taken into partnership." 8 A wrote
to B as follows: "Any thing you can do for the bearer,
Major S. M. Neil, whom I introduce as my friend, will be
done for me, he being a merchant in Clinton. P. S. If you
should accept for Mr. Neil for $I,ooo, I will be bound by
this note." On the strength of this B guaranteed two drafts
of Hartley and Neil. Held: A was not liable for such guar-
anty. A, "might have been willing to become surety for Neil,
and not for Hartley and Neil. The engagement was personal
as to Neil." "
Again, if a guaranty is made for goods advanced to an in-
dividual and they are advanced to the firm of which the in-
dividual named is a member, there is no liability. A gave B
a guaranty for goods to be purchased by C to the extent of
£200. C took D as a partner and B sold goods to C and D
on the credit of the guaranty. Held: A not liable as surety.10
The further question that presents itself is whether or not
you can introduce parol evidence to show that the face of the
guaranty does not express the intent of the parties. In the
case of The Michigan State Bank v. Pecko," the guar-
anty commenced, "C. C. Trowbridge, Esq., President, Detroit,
Michigan," and there was no further evidence of the party
addressed. Money was advanced on the guaranty by the Mich-
igan State Bank, of which Trowbridge was president. Held,
It may be shown by parol that the guaranty was intended for
the bank. The Court applied the common law rule govern-
ing simple contracts to the contract of guaranty, "which is
that they may be sued upon either in the name of the nominal
or the real party * * * and in the present case the letter being
addressed to the person as president, and showing him to be
president of the plaintiff bank and of no other institution,
renders it certain that it was intended for the plaintiff's
benefit." 12 In the case of Smith v. Montgomery,"8 a
guaranty was on its face addressed to "Col. Smith and Pil-
grim" but on its back it was addressed to Smith only. Smith
" White Sewing Machine Co. v. Hines, 61 Mich. 423; Ins. Co. v.
Scott, 81 Ky. 540, accord.
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" 28 Vt. 2oo.
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8 Gratt. 174, accord.
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alone sold the goods. Held, The guarantor is not liable.
The face of the guaranty only could be considered and not
the address on the back. As there was no ambiguity about
the guaranty, parol evidence could not be received to vary it.
In the recent case of Lamm v. Colcord,'4 the issue in the
above cases came directly before the court. The guaranty
read, "Lamm and Co., Chicago, Ill. Dear Sir: You can ex-
tend credit to 0. C. Scoresby to the amount of $4oo and I
will stand good for the same. C. F. Colcord." Goods were
advanced to Scoresby Tailoring Co. Held, Defendant is not
liable in the absence of proof that 0. C. Scoresby solely com-
prised the Scoresby Tailoring Co. This duty, the court said,
is upon the plaintiff. Thus the court intimates that .such
evidence could be introduced and if it were shown that 0. C.
Scoresby and the Scoresby Tailoring Co. were one and the same
person then an action would lie in the name of the latter.
12
1 98 Pac. 355 (Sup. Ct. of Okla., Nov. 12, i9o8).
